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RECENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law-

Reapportionment and County Governments

Municipal

Plaintiffs, taxpayers and citizens of Genesee County, Michigan,
sought to enjoin county officials from entering into a contract authorized by the County Board of Supervisors for construction and installation of a county sewage disposal system. Plaintiffs claimed that the
acts of the board were invalid because the members of the board did
not each represent a proportionate number of the population of the
county. Various large discrepancies in apportionment among the electoral units of the county were demonstrated, and plaintiffs alleged
that the Michigan constitutional provision providing for the representation on the board' violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.! Held: The fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution of the United States does not require equal apportionment of municipal and county government commissions in accordance with population. Johnson v. Genesee County, Michigan, 232 F.
Supp. 567 (E.D. Mich. 1964).
The court pointed out that the suit was not the usual apportionment case because it was an action to set aside an act of an allegedly
malapportioned board, rather than to reapportion it. The court, however, did not base its decision on this distinction. Instead, it stated that
although the fourteenth amendment requires the state legislatures to
be apportioned in representation according to population,' it does not
force state legislatures to apply equal apportionment principles to the
municipal and county legislative bodies under their control and supervision. The court stated that the composition of local units of government is a "state matter," and under the present decisions of the
Supreme Court, the fourteenth amendment does not limit the state
legislatures' exercise of control over the local units.' The decision appears to be based primarily on the fact that the Supreme Court recently refused writ of certiorari and dismissed an appeal for want of
jurisdiction in a similar case.' But that case cannot serve as a true
precedent for this decision because it, as the Mississippi court itself
pointed out,' turned on a decision of when reapportionment was to
'Mich. Const. art. VIII, § 7.
aU.S. Const. amend. XIV.
aBaker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
'Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937); Risty v. Chicago, R. I. &
P. Ry., 270 U.S. 378 (1926).
'Glass v. Hancock County Election Comm'n., 378 U.S. 558 (1964).
-

Miss.-,

156 So. 2d 825

(1963).
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take place and not if such reapportionment was to occur at all.
Mississippi law requires equal apportionment of its county governments.7
The problem presented by the principal case undoubtedly will recur
in the future, and ultimately the Supreme Court of the United States
will be called upon to reconcile the policies presented by the reapportionment cases on one hand and the state control of local unit
cases on the other.
R.B.L.

Corporations

-

Bylaw Restricting Alienability

-

Va-

lidity as to Nonconsenting Shareholder
A corporate bylaw as amended placed a restriction on the alienability of the corporation's stock. The bylaw stipulated that the shares
could be transferred to an outsider provided that the owner of the
shares had first offered them to the other shareholders, and if met
with refusal, had then offered the stock to the corporation at the
price and under the same terms as offered to the outsider. Defendant,
owner of thirty-nine per cent of the corporation's stock, was given
no actual notice of the amendment to the bylaw; but proper corporate procedure was followed by replacing the old stock certificates
with new ones containing this amended bylaw. The corporation and
the majority stockholder initiated this action seeking a declaratory
judgment upholding the validity of the amended bylaw. The trial
court held against the bylaw's validity, reasoning that the shares had
been free of restrictions at the time defendant purchased them and
that a vested right to keep the shares forever free of such restrictions
had arisen at the time of purchase. Held, reversed: The restriction on
alienation is a reasonable one, and a bylaw embodying such a restriction can be enforced against a nonconsenting shareholder who
acquired his stock prior to the enactment of the bylaw. Tu-Vu
Drive-in Corp. v. Ashkins, - Cal. 2d -, 391 P.2d 828 (1964).
The law is well established that absolute restrictions on the alienability of shares are invalid.' Many jurisdictions, however, will uphold
as valid restrictions on alienability which are reasonable.!
"Miss.
1

Code Ann. § 2870 (1957).

See cases cited in Annot., 65 A.L.R. 1159, 1165 (1930); Comment, 18 Iowa L. Rev.

88 (1932).
'See cases cited in Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1318, 1324-45 (1958).
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California courts have used two criteria to determine the reasonableness of a restrictive bylaw-whether the corporate purpose is
fulfilled by the bylaw and the extent to which the rights of the
shareholder are impaired.' A previous case held that bylaws which
have the purpose of restricting the transferability of stock in closed
corporations "are necessary for the protection of the corporation";'
hence, the instant bylaw serves a valid corporate purpose. Secondly,
the court reasons that defendant has not had his rights impaired to
a great degree because he suffers no economic injury from this
restriction. While insuring to him the same price and terms of sale
for his stock, the bylaw merely dictates to whom the transfer shall
be made. The court concludes that this restriction meets the criteria
and, therefore, is reasonable.
The court does not appear bothered by the fact that this restriction
was placed on the shares long after their purchase. Noting that the
power to regulate the rights of corporate shareholders was reserved
to the state by the California constitution,' the court said that this
reservation formed a part of the contract between the shareholder
and the corporation. Therefore, all shareholders acquire their shares
subject to the power of the corporation to alter its contract with them
pursuant to statutory authority.
Although it is clear that the present case reflects the California law
in this area,' it remains to be seen whether other jurisdictions will
follow where the case leads. The reasoning is logical, and the holding
is supportable, but there are likely to be many who believe that it
strips away an incident of ownership too valuable no matter what the
justification."
J. W.C.

'Bennett v. Hibernia Bank, 87 Cal. 2d 540, 305 P.2d 20 (1956); Spencer v. Hibernia
Bank, 186 Cal. App. 2d 702, 9 Cal. Rptr. 867 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
4
Mancini v. Patrizi, 87 Cal. App. 435, 437, 262 Pac. 375, 376 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927).
a Cal. Const. art XII, § 1.
'In an earlier case, Wilson v. Cherokee Drift Mining Co., 14 Cal. 2d 56, 92 P.2d 802
(1939), the California Supreme Court sustained a bylaw which levied a heavy assessment
upon all shares, including those purchased prior to passage of the bylaw.
"For a discussion of the problems involved, see O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of
Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 773 (1952).
The only Texas case on the point, Sandor Petroleum Corp. v. Williams, 321 S.W.2d 614
(Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n.r.e., is very similar in its facts but reaches the opposite
result. See Note, 14 Sw. L.J. 106 (1960) for an article criticizing the case and Note, 38
Texas L. Rev. 499 (1960), for an article defending the case.
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Constitutional Law - Equal Protection Clause Right of Servicemen to Vote
Plaintiffs, members of the armed forces of the United States, were
stationed in San Antonio, Texas, but had enlisted in other states. Each
had lived in San Antonio for more than a year and had purchased a
home in which he lived with his family. On the basis of the same
periods of residence, plaintiffs' wives were allowed to pay poll taxes.
Texas officials refused to allow plaintiffs to vote in Texas because of
the Texas constitutional provision1 that allows servicemen to vote
only in the county in which they resided at the time of enlistment.
Held: The Texas constitutional provision insofar as it denies the right
to vote in Texas to servicemen enlisting in other states but otherwise
meeting Texas voting requirements violates the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Mabry v. Davis, 232 F. Supp. 930 (W.D. Tex. 1964).
Prior to 1954, and for more than 100 years, the Texas constitution
disqualified all military personnel, native and nonresident alike, from
voting in Texas. In 1954, article 6, section 2 was amended to provide
that "any member of the Armed Forces of the United States ...may
vote only in the county in which he or she resided at the time of
entering such service so long as he or she is a member of the Armed
Forces." Four months prior to the decision in the instant case the
Texas Supreme Court in Carrington v. Rash' upheld the Texas restriction as applied to facts similar to those in the instant case. Treatment of military personnel as a separate class for voting purposes was
justified by their status as "floating population." The Texas court
found that, within the class, requirements were nondiscriminatory
because they operated on all members of the class in a like manner
and reasonable because they did not absolutely disqualify servicemen
as voters.! In Mabry the three-judge federal court agreed with the
dissent in Carrington that treating the military as a separate class in
voting matters violates the fourteenth amendment. The court noted
that large groups other than servicemen constantly move from place
to place in today's highly mobile society. Despite the nonselective
wording, the court also found the provision discriminatory within
the class in "that it constitutes a complete abrogation of the right of
' Tex. Const. art. VI, § 2.
Tex. -,
378 S.W.2d 304 (1964).
'The court relied on Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd.
(1959), upholding a North Carolina requirement that voters be
section of the North Carolina constitution and declaring, "The
to have broad powers to determine the conditions under which
be exercised." Id. at 50.

of Elections, 360 U.S. 45
able to read and write any
states have long been held
the right of suffrage may
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plaintiffs to vote in Texas under any circumstances while they are in
military service."
The conflict between the state and federal decisions soon should
be resolved because the United States Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in the Carringtoncase.' Even if the federal court is upheld,
voting patterns in Texas "garrison towns" are unlikely to change
significantly! Plaintiffs in the Mabry case were able to show that
transfer from San Antonio was unlikely because of their special
classifications. The federal court said that servicemen, as such, are
under no disability to form an intent to change their residence, but
it noted that men living on a base or post likely would not meet the
usual Texas residence requirements.7
R. G. R.

Trespass - Flight Over Land - Requirement of Proving Negligence to Recover for Resultant Damage
Defendant, while engaged in spraying an adjoining landowner's
crops, passed over plaintiff's land and unintentionally dropped
poisonous substances which caused considerable damage to plaintiff's
crops and pasture lands. Plaintiff instituted suit claiming trespass to
his land and resultant damage. No claim of negligence in operation
of the airplane was made by plaintiff and no evidence as to the altitude of the flight was introduced. The trial court awarded plaintiff
damages. Held: If an airplane unintentionally is flown over the property of another and an act is done which results in damage to the
property, damages may be recovered without any showing of negligence. Schronk v. Gilliam, 380 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
The court in the principal case pointed out that the rule is now
well accepted that a temporary invasion of the air space over the land
of another for any legitimate purpose is privileged if the flight is
conducted at a reasonable height and does not unreasonably interfere
4 232 F. Supp. at 937.

585 Sup. Ct. 33 (1964).
6 Defendants had emphasized fear of a "military take-over" of local affairs in areas of
a large base under the guidance of a "strong-willed military commander, who was having

trouble with local ofcials." 232 F. Supp. at 936.
The court indicated no disapproval of the requirement of Tex. Election Code art. 5.02
(1952), which requires residence of one year in the state and six months in the county plus
intent (shown by external evidence) to remain in that place indefinitely.
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with the use of the property by the owner.' This privilege, however,
may be lost if the flight is "conducted in such manner as to be dangerous to the land, or persons or things thereon."' Applying these
principles, the court in the principal case held that, even though the
flight would ordinarily have been privileged, the privilege was lost
and the entry constituted a trespass because an act outside the scope
of the privilege was committed by the defendant while upon the
land. The court then applied the rule that negligence need not be
shown in an action for resultant damages of a trespass,' and therefore allowed recovery.
The point which makes the principal case worthy of note is not
the principles of property law stated; rather, it is the fact that the
court allowed the plaintiff to use the trespass remedy. The courts
previously have indicated that the proper remedy in similar cases is
an action for negligence, not for trespass." The court in Schronk distinguishes the previous cases on the ground that in the instant case
the plane actually passed over the plaintiff's land whereas in cases
heretofore decided the plane merely passed close to the plaintiff's land
and the injurious chemicals were carried on the land by air currents.
Therefore, under the distinction made, the plaintiff could recover
without proving negligence in the spraying procedure because the
plane had passed over his land. On the other hand, his neighbor,
whose crops could have been damaged by the same chemicals, would
be required to prove negligence in order to recover because air currents rather than the plane would have carried the chemicals across
his property line. This situation stands as a vivid illustration of the
incongruous results which often occur if trespass is allowed to be
used as a remedy in a suit for resultant damages and property law
principles are carried to their logical conclusion.'
R.B.L.

'United

States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946);

Restatement, Torts S 159, comment

f (1934).
aRestatement, Torts § 194, comment f (1934).
aMcDaniel Bros. v. Wilson, 70 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error ref.; Steger v.
Barrett, 58 Tex. Civ. App. 331, 124 S.W. 174 (1909) error ref.
'Vrazel v. Bieri, 294 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.'r.e.
a Upon motion for rehearing the court relied heavily upon Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Vowell Construction Co., 161 Tex. 432, 341 S.W.2d 148 (1960), where similar principles where applied.
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Federal Interpleader - Unliquidated Tort Claims
Limitations on Jurisdiction

-

Five members of an Ohio family were injured in an automobile
collision with plaintiff's insured. Three of the injured persons filed
suits against the insured in the Ohio state courts for a total of
698,298 dollars. Suits by other injured persons were expected. Plaintiff
paid 25,000 dollars, its maximum liability under the policy, to the
federal district court and asked for relief in the nature of interpleader.
Held: Plaintiff was not entitled to sue under section 1335 of the Judicial Code' because of the lack of diversity among the claimants. Plaintiff was not entitled to relief under rule 22' because, even though the
diversity requirements of rule interpleader were met, the unliquidated
tort claims against plaintiff's insured did not meet rule 22's requirement that the "plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or multiple

liability." National Cas. Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 230
F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
This restrictive interpretation makes interpleader under rule 22
unavailable to a casualty insurer until after at least one claim against
its insured has been reduced to judgment. The requisite diversity of
citizenship and amount in controversy for rule 22 jurisdiction were
present here. Nevertheless, it was said that jurisdiction was lacking because suits against the company's insured were too remote to constitute
the threat of "double or multiple liability" required by rule 22. The
court said, "unless and until at least one of these claims is reduced to
judgment, there is no evidence from which this court can conclude
that the insurer is in danger of facing claims in excess of policy
limits."' Other objections were that interpleader would (1) allow the
insurer to evade its obligation to defend claims against the insured and
(2) oust state court jurisdiction over a local matter.
Prior cases are conflicting. A federal district court in Missouri
refused to allow a casualty company to interplead potential judgment
creditors of its insured.' Later, a federal court in Louisiana allowed
interpleader by a casualty insurer, emphasizing the unique Louisiana
statute allowing a direct action against the insurer.' In contrast to
' 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1958). Section 1335 only requires that there be "two or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship."
'Fed. R. Civ. P. 22. Because rule 22 makes no special jurisdictional requirements, 28
U.S.C. S 1332 (1958), applies. In a diversity case there must be complete diversity of
citizenship between the stakeholder on one hand and all of the claimants on the other.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kraft, 200 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1953).
3 230 F. Supp. at 621.
'American Indem. Co. v. Hale, 71 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Mo. 1947).
'Pan American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1960).
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the instant case, both of these cases involved sufficient diversity for
either equitable (rule 22) or statutory interpleader. The court in

the instant case does not indicate whether it would also reject an
attempt to interplead tort claimants if the action otherwise qualified
under section 1335 (statutory interpleader). It only notes that the
statutory requirement of minimal diversity' between claimants was
not met. Whether the court would also withhold statutory interpleader from a casualty insurer until at least one claim was reduced
to judgment is a question that must await presentation of the appropriate fact situation.

R.G.R

Conflict of Laws

-

Choice of Law Rule

-

Statute of

Limitations
Plaintiffs, all crew members of an airplane manufactured by defendant in California, were injured in a crash allegedly due to defects
in construction. Five years after the crash, which occurred in Florida,
plaintiffs sued defendant manufacturer in the southern district of
New York alleging breach of express and implied warranties of fitness. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. Defendant
claimed the action was barred by the applicable statutes of limitations of both California and Florida. Plaintiff claimed the action was
founded upon the warranties in the written contract of sale of the
plane and that the Florida contract in writing statute,' which allows
five years in which to bring an action, was the applicable statute of
limitations. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment. Held, affirmed: (1) Under the New York "borrowing"
statute,' the action "arose" in California and therefore was barred.!
(2) Even if the statute had been interpreted to designate Florida as
the place where the action "arose," the five year contract in writing
statute of Florida would not have been applicable because an action
'How

very minimal this diversity may be is indicated by Haynes v. Felder, 239 F.2d

868 (5th Cir. 1957).
'Fla.

Stat. Ann. S 95.11(3)

(1960).

'N.Y. Sess. Laws 1949, ch. 855, S 13, which provided: "An action based upon a cause
of action arising without the state cannot be commenced after the expiration of the time
limited by the laws of either the state or the place without the state where the cause of
" In 1962 the words "accruing" and "accrued" were substituted for
action arose ..
"arising" and "arose" but this change would not seem to change the meaning of the statute.
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 202.
'Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(3), provides for a one year statute of limitations for all
personal injuries actions.
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for breach of implied warranty is essentially an action in tort or upon
an unwritten contract. George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d
73 (2d Cir. 1964).
The principal case is a very important one in two respects. First,
the court, in applying the New York "borrowing" statute, holds that
even though the substantive law of Florida would govern the existence of the cause of action, the California statute of limitations would
be applicable. The court came to this conclusion by reasoning that
even though the injury occurred in Florida, the policy of the state
of New York established in the "borrowing" statute was to restrict
the bringing of actions that were barred by limitations elsewhere.
Therefore, although the court states the usual rule that in most
cases the law of the place of the injury will determine whether
liability exists, it holds that that same place will not necessarily be the
place where the action "arose" for the purpose of determining the
applicable statute of limitations. Under this interpretation it seems
that the place where the action "arose" for the purpose of the "borrowing" statute will be the one state in some way connected with
the action which has the most restrictive statute of limitations. The
New York Court of Appeals has not yet so interpreted the "borrowing" statute,' and could adopt a wholly different approach which,
under the Erie' doctrine, the federal, as well as the state courts, would
be obliged to follow.'
The second important aspect of the case is the court's statement
that even if the Florida statute of limitations were to be applied the
action still would be barred because the action in the principal case
was not one founded upon a contract in writing. The court overruled
the plaintiffs' contentions that the cause of action for breach of
implied warranty necessarily was founded upon the written contract of sale of the airplane and instead asserted that the cause of
action, even though denominated as one based upon implied warranty,
was in fact an action upon an unwritten contract or tort, and therefore was barred by the Florida statutes governing such actions. If
followed by other courts, this characterization of the action on an
implied warranty as an action in tort or as an action upon an unwritten contract could have important effects upon the entire field
of products liability law.7
R.B.L.
4The New York Court of Appeals has expressed its willingness to apply the law of two
sister-states in a single tort action in Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279
(1963), but there the court was not dealing with the borrowing statute,
a Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
6
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
'See 2 Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability S 40.01(1) (2d ed. 1964).
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Administrative Law-

Interstate Commerce Act Reparations Award a Reviewable, Final Order

The Interstate Commerce Commission awarded reparations to a
shipper for unjust and unreasonable rates charged and collected by
several carriers. The carriers initiated an action in district court to
have the reparations order set aside. The ICC, acting for the shipper,
moved to dismiss the suit, claiming that the carriers could not bring
suit to set aside the reparations order but instead must wait and contest it when the shipper sues to enforce its award. The district court
allowed the carriers to bring their own suit.' Held, affirmed: The
carriers may sue to set aside a reparations order and are not restricted
to challenging its validity as a defense to the shipper's enforcement
suit. ICC v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 334 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1964).
The Interstate Commerce Act provides a two-step procedure to
receive and enforce a reparations order.' By the terms of section
16(1),' the ICC can award reparations to a party injured by a
violation of the act. If the violator refuses to comply with the Commission's order, however, the party receiving the award must gain
compliance through section 16 (2) ,4 which allows an enforcement suit
to be brought in a United States district court. It was within this
framework that the present controversy arose. There was, however,
one significant variation. In the instant case the carriers which had
been held in violation of the act by the Commission for charging
unreasonable rates did not choose to wait and contest the validity of
the Commission's order in the shipper's enforcement suit. Rather, for
the first time in the seventy-five year history of the act, the carriers
initiated their own suit. The suit was based on section 17 (9),' which
allows the bringing of a suit to set aside a reviewable, final "order"
of the Commission.
Having no case precedent to follow, the court was forced to make
an initial interpretation of the applicable sections of the act. The ICC
contended that its reparations award was not such a reviewable, final
order as would allow the bringing of a suit under section 17 (9). The
court found that a reparations award differs from the regular, reviewable, final order in only one respect-it is not self-executing. Because
a governmental agency has no procedure by which a party can be
forced to comply with its order to pay money, the order must be
enforced by bringing suit in the proper court. This judicial enforce'Atlantic
224 Stat.
343 Stat.
4 43 Stat.
554 Stat.

Coast Line R.R. v. United States, 213 F. Supp. 199 (M.D. Fla. 1963).
379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. S 1 (1958).
633 (1924), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 16(1) (1958).
633 (1924), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1958).
913 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 17(9) (1958).
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ment, the court said, does not alter the nature of the order. It was
the Commission's findings that the carriers had violated a provision
of the act and were accountable therefore that constituted a final and
reviewable "order," as that word is used in section 17(9).
Furthermore, the court believed that to allow the carriers to bring
their own suit is to assure fair and equal treatment of the parties. It
has never been questioned that if a party seeking a reparations award
has his complaint denied by the Commission, he may obtain judicial
review.' Therefore, symmetry is served by permitting the carriers to
do likewise if they are the losing parties at the Commission level.
This same court reached an opposite result in a case' with similar
facts arising under the Railway Labor Act.! An employee had obtained an award from the National Railroad Adjustment Board, but
before he filed an enforcement suit his employer filed a declaratory
judgment suit to set aside the Board's order. This employer's suit
was dismissed on the ground that the employee's statutory right
could not be circumvented. However, in the court's mind, the highly
specialized aspect of carrier regulation is sufficient to distinguish the
present case and to justify its precedent-setting decision."
J.W.C.

Labor Law -National

Labor Relations Act
Employee's Right to Reinstatement

-

Two of respondent's employees, Davis and Harmon, were attempting to organize a union in respondent's shop. Pate, another employee,
told respondent that the organizers had told him the union would use
dynamite to get control of the shop if the proper recognition was not
received. Respondent discharged Davis and Harmon who later filed
claims under sections 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor
Relations Act,' claiming the discharges constituted unfair labor prac"United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949).
'New Orleans Public Belt R.R. Comm'n v. Ward, 182 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1950).
844 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1958).
9 It is important to note that while the Railway Labor Act provides for unlimited
judicial review of an award made by the National Railroad Adjustment Board, that act has
no other statutory grant of review comparable to that provided in section 17(9) of -the
Interstate Commerce Act.
As a further distinguishing factor (but in connection with the foregoing one), the
actions of the National Railroad Adjustment Board are not subject to the Administrative
Piocedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. S§ 1001-1011 (1958), as are the actions
of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
149 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(1) and (a)(3) (1958). The
applicable portions of these sections are as follows: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for
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tices. The NLRB found that the statements attributed to the two
employees had not in fact been made and, therefore, that the discharges constituted unfair labor practices, requiring an order for
reinstatement with the usual back pay from the time of the wrongful
discharges.! The court of appeals refused to enforce the Board's order,'
and the Board petitioned for writ of certiorari. Held: An unfair
labor practice is committed by the employer under section 8 (a) (1)
if it is found that he discharged an employee engaging in a protected
activity; that the basis of the discharge was an alleged act of misconduct in the course of that activity; and that the employee was
not, in fact, guilty of that misconduct. NLRB v. Burnup &qSims,
Inc., 85 Sup. Ct. 171 (1964).
The holding in the principal case settles a conflict among the courts
of appeals upon the question of whether an employer is justified in
discharging an innocent employee who he, in good faith, believes is
employing unlawful and coercive means in carrying on ordinarily
protected activities.4 As a result of this holding, the employer must
be ready to reinstate the employees with full back pay if it is later
discovered that the organizational activities of the employees were
not outside the scope of the protection afforded such activities under
the act. The Court stated: "A protected activity acquires a precarious
status if innocent employees can be discharged while engaging in it,
even though the employer acts in good faith."'
The disregarding of the employer's good faith and the requiring
of payment of full back pay from the date of discharge was protested
by Mr. Justice Harlan in his separate opinion. He stated that "it is
hardly fair that the employer should be faced with the choice of risking damage to his business or incurring a penalty for taking honest
action to thwart it."' His opinion suggests that the correct ruling
would be one ordering reinstatement with back pay from the time
the employer knew or should have known that the employees had
been wrongfully discharged.!

R.B.L.
an employer--(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 . . . [or] (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.
2 137 N.L.R.B. 766 (1962).
a322 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1963).

4 Compare the court of appeals opinion in the principal case with NLRB v. Cambria
Clay Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d 48 (6th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Industrial Cotton Mills, 208
F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1953); and Cusano v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1951).
85 Sup. Ct. at 173.
eIbid.
7 Ibid.
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Testamentary Capacity -

Restoration to Sanity

Deceased, who previously had been adjudged insane, was held to
be restored to sanity. Thereafter, on the same day, she executed a will
in conformity with section 59 of the Texas Probate Code,' which
sets out the requirements for a self-proved will. Contestant at the
probate of the will alleged lack of testamentary capacity. Proponents
asserted that the order of restoration was conclusive as to testamentary capacity at the time entered and for the remainder of the
day. The trial court granted a summary judgment for proponents on
the issue of capacity; the court of civil appeals affirmed.' Held: In
a will contest, a judgment of restoration to sanity is not conclusive
and raises no presumption on the question of testamentary capacity,
even as to wills executed during the day on which the judgment was
entered. In re Price's Estate, - Tex. -, 375 S.W.2d 900 (1964).
The instant case is the first to deal with the question of what testamentary capacity effects, if any, flow from an adjudication of restoration to sanity. At first glance the holding may seem to be unwarranted
because the court gave no recognition to the adjudication of restoration to sanity. In cases determining a resoration order's effect upon
the tolling of a statute of limitation, it has been held that the order
creates a conclusive presumption of sanity on the day it is rendered
and a rebuttable presumption thereafter.' In a suit brought to have
a deed which was executed on the day of a restoration order declared invalid, the court held that the order created a rebuttable, but
not a conclusive, presumption of sanity on the day rendered." But
the court in the principal case distinguished these cases by an appeal
to the legislative policy expressed in section 88 of the Texas Probate
Code.' That section places the burden on the proponent of a will to
prove that the testator was of sound mind when the will was executed
unless the will is self-proved, whereas in the usual case a person
executing any other instrument is presumed sane. Therefore, if the
will in the principal case had not been self-proved, there would have
been the usual burden on the proponent to prove sanity. Because the
will in question was self-proved, however, a presumption of sanity
existed; but the court held that this presumption, without more, was
'Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 59 (1956).
2 369 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
'Holt v. Hedberg, 316 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Starnes v. Campbell, 119
S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error dism.; Mitchell v. Inman, 156 S.W. 290 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1913) error ref.
"Tipton v. Tipton, 140 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error dism., judgrn. cor.
'Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 88 (1956).
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not enough to justify a summary judgment for the proponents on
the issue of testamentary capacity.
The effect of the court's decision, therefore, is that the order of
restoration merely removes the testamentary disabilities created by the
prior adjudication of insanity. It places the testator in no better position than he would have been had his soundness of mind never been
questioned.
R.L.C.

